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It is not uncommon that publicly employed physicians also have income from work 
outside the hospital, often termed moonlighting. There is little empirical evidence of 
such activity. In this paper we investigate which factors that may influence 
physicians’ choice of work between the public hospital sector and elsewhere. An 
exceptionally high wage increase in 1996 for one group of hospital physicians 
(assistant physicians) serves as a natural experiment, and we analyse whether wages 
in general and this reform in particular have affected physicians’ external earnings. 
For assistant physicians we find that higher wages at public hospitals affect negatively 
both the decisions to earn income externally, and level of income once active. For 
consultant physicians, on the other hand, there was no such response to the wage 
increase. Several hospital specific factors representing job specific work 
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1. Introduction 
 
In predominantly public health care systems as in the Scandinavian countries and in 
the UK, it is considered a potential problem that physicians take up jobs and earn 
income from external sources. In addition to a main employment contract with a 
public hospital, it is not uncommon that physicians earn considerable additional 
income from work outside the hospital. Such activity is often termed moonlighting. 
This constitutes a problem if it effects hospital production negatively due to lack of 
key personnel, or if it implies giving access to treatment for diagnoses or patients of 
low priority. Countries with a National Health Care System often suffer from 
unacceptably long waiting lists, often claimed to be related to lack of key health 
personnel. Thus, for the public health care institutions, on the margin moonlighting 
may affect their cost efficiency as well as objectives concerning treatment levels and 
prioritisation among patient groups. So as to attract physicians to the public hospitals 
and induce them to supply additional effort at these institutions rather than to external 
activities, wage policy and manning restrictions to control workload are integral parts 
of a public health care policy. In this paper we will analyse how wage settlements and 
measures for workload affect physicians’ decisions to earn income from other sources 
than a public hospital which is their main employer.  The institutional framework is 
the Norwegian national health care system, where wage policies and wage bargaining 
between the physicians’ union and hospital owners seem to have been used actively 
for affecting allocation of resources among different health care producers. 
Based on available statistics (OECD 2005), the density of physicians and 
nurses in Norway is at or above average OECD level. Unacceptable waiting lists in 
the public health care sector and alleged shortage of key health personnel may 
indicate that health care personnel are inefficiently used. A specific problem may be   3
that physicians work too short hours for their main employer. Thus, during the 
1990ies a growing concern emerged that physicians devoted to much time to work 
outside the hospitals. However, hospital employment increased during this period. 
Some evidence has been provided indicating that this increase in number of 
physicians has contributed little to increasing number of patients treated (Bratlid 
2000). A lower than expected level of patient treatment may be due to extra work 
outside the hospital, using physician resources that could otherwise have been used at 
public hospitals. 
We investigate which factors determine physicians’ decision to moonlight and 
earn income as self-employed outside the hospital
1. When physicians have additional 
employment beyond ordinary hospital work, the reason may be found in good income 
prospects through alternative employment, for example due to a large demand for 
services in the private and independent part of the health care sector. Alternatively, it 
may result from problematic working conditions at the hospitals. There is a cost to the 
public hospitals when physicians devote their efforts to supplementary employment, 
since this labour could alternatively be used working for the main employer, either by 
being more productive during normal working hours, or by working overtime. Wage 
policy is one of the instruments used by the government to attract key health 
personnel, and in particular to induce physicians to allocate additional work effort to 
hospitals.
2  
To mitigate a trend among publicly employed physicians to work outside the 
hospitals, and induce more work at the hospitals, a substantial wage increase was 
granted in 1996. The wage settlement was particularly favourable for assistant 
                                                 
1 Another source of external income is from part-time positions. Unfortunately, we have no information 
on part-time work outside the hospital in our data set. 
2 Planned overtime work is in general not legal. However, physicians are exempted from this 
regulation, and can plan for considerable overtime work.   4
physicians, but also consultant physicians got a large increase in wages. Higher wages 
might in isolation contribute to reduced demand for physicians. Two factors work in 
the opposite direction. Firstly, the health personnel labour market was probably out of 
equilibrium in the sense of being supplier rationed for physicians as well as nurses. 
Secondly, the following year (1997), in order to induce higher activities within the 
public hospitals, the government decided to introduce an activity based finance 
system, expectedly increasing demand for physicians at any given wage level. During 
the three years preceding this wage increase, wages were rather stable, although wage 
rates may have varied differently among groups of physicians. 
The wage settlement in 1996 creates a natural experiment enabling us to see 
whether wages in general affect the decisions to moonlight, and the level of 
moonlighting once participating. Since the wage increase was much higher for 
assistant physicians than for consulting physicians we also focus on possible 
differences in moonlighting activity between the two groups. Our data cover the 
period 1993-1997, that is, three years before and two years after the wage settlement.
3 
The data also include information about relevant working conditions like capacity 
utilisation, health care personnel per patient and type of hospital, considered equally 
important for choice of work effort at the hospitals. We have information about 
individual specific observable characteristics, like age and family situation, which 
according to standard labour market theory are held to be important for labour supply. 
Use of panel data enables us in addition to control for unobservable individual 
characteristics, as well as time variant selection into moonlighting.  
There are relatively few studies investigating labour supply of physicians. 
Relevant papers include Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994) and Showalter and Thurston 
                                                 
3 Wage settlement was in effect as of May 1996. Wage rates are observed in October each year.   5
(1997) on US data, and Baltagi, Bratberg and Holmås (2003) and Sæther (2003) using 
Norwegian data. The Norwegian studies find positive wage elasticities for employee 
physicians. The US studies also estimate positive elasticities for physicians working 
as self-employed but with less clear results for employee physicians. Moonlighting in 
general has attracted interest in the literature but there are very few papers that 
address this phenomenon in the health care sector. Biglaiser and Ma (2003) show that 
moonlighting may be welfare improving, while Iversen (1997) and Barros and 
Martinez-Giralt (2002) are other relevant papers investigating welfare effects of 
interactions between public and private sectors. A paper that considers relative wage 
effects both theoretically and empirical is Conway and Kimmel (1998). They find that 
moonlighting as an option leads to relatively high wage elasticities. 
Thus, this study offers new empirical evidence on physicians’ income 
generating activities beyond their main job at a hospital. The paper is organized as 
follows. In the next section we provide an institutional outline and a theoretical 
background for how wages and job characteristics may effect decisions on working 
hours of physicians. Data are presented in section 3, and a discussion of our empirical 
approach is given in section 4. In section 5 results are discussed, while section 6 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Institutional and theoretical background. 
Norway has around 14.000 trained physicians (OECD 2005), of which more than half 
work at publicly owned hospitals. During the period of investigation, a hospital 
belonged to one of 19 counties
4. According to scope and complexity of treatment 
offered, they are grouped into regional (university) hospitals, central hospitals, county 
                                                 
4 As of 2002, ownership of hospitals was transferred to the state.   6
hospitals and local hospitals. It is common and in accordance with employee 
regulations that hospital physicians have jobs outside of the hospitals, quite often in 
ambulatory service or as a private specialist. The reverse is also possible, that a 
private specialist has part time employment at a hospital.
5 Physicians are exempted 
from regulations banning planned overtime, enabling the hospital and its employed 
physicians to plan for overtime work within the main hospital job. 
Almost 100% of physicians are members of the national physicians’ union, 
which bargains wages and work conditions on behalf of its members. The union also 
bargains on behalf of private specialists, basically on public refunds for treatment of 
patients referred to them through the public health care system. Wage rates are 
bargained every year at a central level, with room for local bargaining as well. 
Individual and local adjustments of wages take place through this local wage 
bargaining. There is also room for some local discretion at county and hospital level 
in fitting employees into wage brackets. Thus, there will be variation in wage levels 
across regions and hospitals, as well as over time and between types of physicians.  
As previously mentioned, there are indications of some shortage of physicians 
working in the dominantly public part of the hospital sector. Policy during recent 
years has been aimed at attracting physicians to work at hospitals, and to induce them 
to work longer hours at the hospitals. This was one intention of the government side 
when accepting a generous wage settlement for hospital physicians in 1996. There 
may, however, be several factors explaining both the shortage of physicians at public 
hospitals, and problems in extracting sufficient hours of work from them. In addition 
to wage differentials, unfavourable working conditions at the public hospitals, for 
example related to stress from too high capacity utilization and burdensome patients, 
                                                 
5 These will be excluded from our analysis.   7
may induce physicians to supply additional hours externally instead of work overtime 
for the main employer. It is interesting to look at the relative importance of wages and 
work environment for decisions to moonlight. For hospital owners, the outcome may 
have policy consequences, in the sense that monetary remuneration and improved 
working conditions may supplement each other as incentive mechanisms for attracting 
physicians to specific activities and work places. 
We will use a standard utility maximization approach to represent the 
physicians’ choice of hours of work. Although wages are bargained by the union and 
counties (with some additional employer discretion) it should from the above be clear 
that each physician may individually, within limits, determine how many hours she 
wants to work at different work places, for example a public hospital or a private 
practice. 
Consider the following model, representative of a physician with several 
possible income sources. Wages and job specific work characteristics matter for 
choice of additional working hours beyond contracted normal time, l
c. Utility depends 
on consumption (income y) and leisure, which we with time normalised to 1 write as 
(1-  Σil
i). A vector Φ represents work attributes, which are either favourable or 
unpleasant. The index i = c, o, m indicates a specific job or income source, either 
contracted hours at a hospital, l
c, overtime l
o, or additional jobs outside the hospital, 
l
m.
6 For ease of exposition, we ignore income from non-labour sources. The utility or 
disutility of work characteristics, element x
i for job i, may be constant or variable in 
hours of work supplied
7. We let job characteristics in the utility function be 
represented by the function θ
h φ(l
h) for hospital work (normal time and overtime) and 
by θ
m φ(l
m) for external jobs (moonlighting), where θ
j, j=h,m, is a job-specific shift 
                                                 
6 Without loss of generality, we investigate only one outside job opportunity (or several identical). 
7 There may of course be more than one characteristic for each job, however, ignoring that possibility 
can de done without loss of generality.   8
parameter. Individual characteristics (gender, age, marital status etc.) are represented 
by a vector Ψ. We then write the utility function of a representative physician as 
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Assuming that less than a 100% position as well as overtime are possible, the 
physician chooses number of hours at the hospital, which include contracted hours, l
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and overtime, l
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i, 
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By definition of a main job we assume that always l
c > 0, implying equality of bracket 
in (3), and since we assume that the physician can choose to work less than 100%, 
there is an interior solution for l
c. We see from (3a,b,c) that a physician may choose to 
substitute time at the main job for moonlighting, either by adjusting ordinary 
contracted working hours, or by overtime. Furthermore, interior solutions with   9
different wage levels externally and internally are possible, since work characteristics 
may compensate. On the other hand, supplementary work (overtime or moonlighting) 
may not at all be relevant due to their wage levels and job characteristics. Lastly, from 
(3b,c) we see that an increase in overtime wages or improved working conditions at 
the hospital may induce a physician to start working overtime and stop moonlighting, 
i.e. set  l
m = 0. 
Straightforward comparative statics
8 on (3) will provide the usual 
indeterminate wage effect from changes in wage level w
i on hours of work in job i. 
The magnitude of the wage effect depends also on how concerned the physicians are 
with work characteristics, like stress or fringe benefits. Consider a work place burden 
like stress (for example too may beds occupied and therefore a very high workload 
during the work day), such that the marginal effect of increased work is negative, then 
the effect of a wage increase on work hours will be moderated compared to a situation 
where these burdens did not exist. Furthermore, limiting ourselves to a situation 
where the physician is moonlighting in addition to the contracted working hours, l
o > 
0, the effect of a wage increase at the hospital, Δw
c > 0, is to reduce supply of hours 
moonlighting,  Δl
m < 0. Lastly, the effect of a further improvement of working 
conditions, i.e. an increase in θ
i when at the outset  0 ) ( ' ≥
i l φ , affects l
i  positively
9. 
Symmetrically, for work characteristics representing a disutility, l
i is reduced if 
conditions are worsened.  
Thus, physicians will adjust their labour supply in the hospital and externally 
according to wage levels and income prospects both places, as well as according to 
                                                 
8 Note that some comparative static results may depend on sign of second order differentials, which 
may sometimes be hard to determine. However, some simplifying and unproblematic assumptions will 
enable signing effects unambiguously. 
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.   10
work characteristics like stress or fringe benefits. Changes in wage levels and work 
conditions will affect the degree to which physicians, on the margin, take up jobs 
outside of the hospitals. In the empirical section, we will use different estimators  to 
determine the decision to have additional income from sources outside of the hospital 
(moonlight). Independent variables include hospital wages and proxies for hospital 
work characteristics, in addition to individual and hospital specific variables. In 
particular it is of interest to trace effects on out-of-hospital income from a natural 
experiment in 1996, when hospital wages were increased quite considerably, with an 
expected fall in participation and income from moonlighting. 
 
3. Data and variables 
Our main data source is a personnel register administered by the Norwegian 
Association of Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA), providing individual 
specific information on wages and working hours of public servants employed by 
counties and municipalities. Employees of the main bulk of Norwegian hospitals are 
represented. The NALRA data have been merged with individual as well as hospital 
specific information from Statistics Norway. All data sources are public registers. 
Data on income from self-employment are extracted from tax records. We use a panel 
data set covering the period 1993 to 1997 
  During this period, sixty-four hospitals reported to the NALRA register, which 
constitutes a majority of Norwegian hospitals.
10 However, for three hospitals 
information on occupancy rate and length of stay was not available, reducing the 
sample to physicians within 61 hospitals. We further restrict the sample to include 
                                                 
10 The most important exceptions are the National Hospital (Rikshospitalet) and the National Cancer 
Hospital (Radiumhospitalet), both opreated by the central government. Later (2002) the government 
has taken over responsibility for all hospitals.   11
only physicians holding a seventy-five percent position or more in a hospital. The 
final sample then includes 5868 physicians.  
 
  (Table 1 about here) 
 
The variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 1, while in Table 2 yearly 
summary statistics are reported. Focusing first on hospital wages, we see that the 
wage settlement in 1996 resulted in an increase in the mean hourly basic wage from 
about NOK 138 in 1995 to NOK 155 in 1996 (a 11 percent increase), while it stayed 
fairly constant from 1993 to 1995. Notice also that the proportion of physicians 
working as assistant physicians is relatively stable over the whole period, varying 
between 0.36 and 0.39. Turning to income from self-employment, we notice that 
while there has been a weak reduction in the mean income from 1993 to 1996 (from 
about NOK 26000 to NOK 24000), there was a marked reduction in income from 
self-employment in 1997
11 (NOK 20900). However, conditioning on physicians with 
a positive income from self-employment, we do not find the same clear time pattern. 
On the contrary, after a relatively large drop in mean income from 1993/1994 to 1995, 
there has been an increase from 1995 to 1997. This indicates that in 1997 the 
proportion of physicians with income from self-employment has fallen. Looking at 
table 2, we see that this is exactly what has happened. While the proportion of 
physicians with income from self-employment was between 0.32 and 0.34 from 1993 
to 1996, this proportion dropped to 0.29 in 1997.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
                                                 
11 Since the wage settlement came into effect in June/July 1996, and since the adjustment to the wage 
increase probably take some time, it is not surprising that we don’t see any effect in 1996.   12
 
Looking at the variables measuring working conditions at the hospitals, we see that 
the occupancy rate varied between 85 and 88 percent. From 1993 to 1997 there has 
been an increase in number of physicians per bed from 0.34 to 0.44, and nurses per 
bed have increased from 1.13 to 1.38. Costs per hospital bed showed a marked 
increase during 1996 and 1997, potentially caused by the wage increase.  
Since the wage settlement in 1996 was particularly generous for assistant 
physicians, it might be interesting to see whether the moonlighting activity for 
assistant physicians differ from that of consultant physicians. Tables 3 and 4 present 
descriptive statistics for the two groups. First we note that assistant physicians in our 
sample certainly had a larger wage increase than consultant physicians; from 1995 to 
1996 the average wage for assistant physicians increased by approximately 19.5 
percent while the wage increase for consultant physicians were more moderate (about 
8.5 percent). Dividing the sample into two groups of physicians further indicates that 
only assistant physicians responded to the wage increase by a reduction in self-
employment. On average assistant physicians reduced income from self-employment 
by 17.8 percent from 1996 to 1997. Much of this reduction can probably be explained 
by a large drop from 1996 to 1997 in the proportion of assistant physicians earning 
income as self-employed. For consultant physicians, on the other hand, there are no 
clear indications of any adjustment of their moonlighting activity due to the wage 
increase. 
 
(Tables 3 and 4 about here) 
 
4. Econometric method   13
To investigate how hospital wages and work conditions affect moonlighting, we use a 
two stage panel data sample selection model where we first estimate a “participation” 
equation and then an income equation. There are several reasons why we think this 
model is appropriate. Firstly, theory and descriptive statistics indicate that the effect 
of hospital wages on moonlighting will work both through the participation decision 
and magnitude of work once participating. To be able to say something about how 
wages affect also the decision to engage in moonlighting, a two stage model is 
required. Next, since the majority of the physicians do not earn income outside of the 
hospitals it is likely that there is selection into moonlighting. Another potential 
problem is the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the income equation. To deal 
with both unobserved heterogeneity and selection, panel data are required. If the 
selection process were time invariant, standard estimators like the fixed effect 
estimator would solve the problem. However, this is not likely to be the case, and in 
the rest of this section we describe a panel data estimator that takes account of both 
unobserved heterogeneity among the physicians, and sample selection into the sub-
group consisting of moonlighters.  
Consider the following panel data model: 
 
(4)   it i it it x y ε α β + + =
* ;      
(5)   it i it it u z d + + = η γ
*   
(6)       1 = it d if  , 0
* > it d  0 otherwise 
(7)   it it it d y y ⋅ =
*   
   14
Here,  i ( N i ,..., 1 = ) denotes the physicians and t ( T t ,..., 1 = ) the time periods. 
Equation (4) represents the true model for determination of income from outside 
sources, while (5) models the individual choice to participate in external income 
generating activities. Physician i’s income as self-employed in period t, the latent 
variable 
*
it y , is only observable for those who choose to work outside the hospitals. 
This choice depends on the outcome of the indicator variable  it d , since the latent 
variable 
*
it d  is unobservable. The coefficientsβ  and γ  are the unknown parameters 
we wish to estimate while  i α  and  i η  are unobservable time-invariant individual-
specific effects. Covariates  it x  and  it z  are vectors of explanatory variables which may 
contain common elements, and all variables in  it z  and  it x  are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous. The  it ε  and  it u  are unobserved disturbances. The sample selection 
problem arises because the external income  it y  is only observable for physicians with 
1 = it d . Applying for example OLS only on the observations for physicians who 
moonlight will lead to biased estimates of the β  vector.  
To correct for sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity in the external 
income equation we follow a two-step approach proposed by Kyriazidou (1997)
12, see 
also Askildsen, Baltagi and Holmås (2003) for an application on nurses’ labour 
supply. This estimator relies on pairwise differences over time applied to equation (4) 
for individuals satisfying  t s d d is it ≠ = = , 1 . The estimator is flexible in the sense that 
the individual effects,  i α  and  i η , are allowed to be correlated with the explanatory 
variables ( it x  and  it z ) and the error terms ( it ε  and  it u ). No distributional assumptions 
are made concerning the error terms. 
                                                 
12 Several other sample selection panel data estimators exists, see for example Vella (1998) for an 
overview.   15
Following Kyriazidou (1997) and Dustman and Rochina-Barrachinna (2000), 
the sample selection effect for each time period may be defined as  
() i is is i it it i i is it it its z u z u z z E η γ η γ η α ε λ − ≤ − ≤ ≡ , , , , ~ , ~ |   
       ( )) , , ~ , ~ | , , ; , ( i i is it is it it i is i it z z u u F z z η α ε η γ η γ − − Λ =  
 
() i it it i is is i i is it is ist z u z u z z E η γ η γ η α ε λ − ≤ − ≤ ≡ , , , , ~ , ~ |   
       ( )) , , ~ , ~ | , , ; , ( i i is it it is is i it i is z z u u F z z η α ε η γ η γ − − Λ =  
where  () it it it z x z , ~ = ,  () is is is z x z , ~ = ,  () ⋅ Λ  is an unknown function and  () ⋅ F   i s  a n  
unknown joint conditional distribution function of the errors. Taking first differences, 
we can rewrite the main equation (4) in any time period t and s as 
 
(8)  ( ) ( ) ( ) its ist its i i is it is it v x x y y + − + − + − = − λ λ α α β   
 
where  () ( ) ist its is it its v λ λ ε ε − − − ≡  is a new error term. Obviously, this error term 
satisfies  () 0 , 1 | = = = i is it its d d v E ς  by construction. If the sample selection effect is 
the same over periods, first-differencing (8) will eliminate both the individual-specific 
component and the selection effect. Under rather weak distributional assumptions
13, 
the sample selection effect  its λ  and  ist λ  will be the same as long as  γ γ is it z z = . Thus, 
applying first-differences will eliminate both the individual time invariant effect and 
the selection effect. Notice that since first-differences are taken on an individual basis, 
the functional form of Λ may vary across physicians. 
Since  z includes continuous variables,  γ it z  and  γ is z  will differ for most 
physicians in our sample. However, differencing across observations when the values 
                                                 
13 See Kyriazidou (1997) for a discussion of the necessary assumptions.    16
of  γ it z  and  γ is z  are close, will also approximately eliminate the unobserved 
expectation. Thus, to make the estimator operational, Kyriazidou (1997) suggests the 
following procedure. In the first step, get consistent estimates of the parameters in the 
selection equation. Here, we estimate a conditional logit model using only the 
physicians who change status over time. In the next step we use these estimates to 
construct weights which finally are included in a weighted least square regression. 
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n
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K is a “kernel density” function, and  n h  is a sequence of “bandwidths” that tends to 
zero as  ∞ → n .  
 
5. Empirical results 
The following main issues are considered: Firstly, does the wage level at the hospital 
influence physicians’ decisions to moonlight and earn income as self-employed 
outside of the hospitals? We investigate this question by estimating the effect of   17
variation in hourly hospital wages on external income. An important advantage of our 
data set and time period is that it includes a generous wage settlement in 1996, 
providing sufficient exogenous variation in the wage variable both over time and 
between groups of physicians. Note that the wage settlement was much more 
generous for assistant physicians than for consultant physicians. We are not only 
interested in investigating what factors that affect the magnitude of self-employment, 
but also what affects the participation decision. In the analysis it is therefore essential 
to separate the participation decision from the magnitude of the activity. Secondly, are 
the incidence and magnitude of self-employment among hospital physicians affected 
by hospital specific factors, like indicators of workload? 
To shed some light on these questions, we use the sample selection model 
outlined in the previous section. First we estimate a conditional logit model. The 
results for this participation equation are reported in Table 5, column 4. As identifying 
variables we use dummy variables measuring the degree of centrality of the 
municipality where the physicians live. The estimates from the logit model are then 
used to construct “kernel weights”. We use a normal density for the kernel, and the 
bandwidth is set to 
5 / 1 − ⋅ = n h hn  where  1 = h
14. Finally, these weights are used in a 
weighted least square regression where we apply the Huber/White estimator for the 
variance (to take account of the weights). The results from estimating this income 
equation are given in the last column of table 5. For comparison, in columns 1 and 2 
of Table 5 we also report results from OLS and fixed effect regressions
15. The large 
differences between the estimates of the OLS and fixed effect models clearly indicates 
                                                 
14 We have experimented with different values of h but this had very little effect on the final estimates. 
15 The OLS model gives unbiased estimates only when no sample selection or unobserved 
heterogeneity exists. The estimates from the fixed effect model are unbiased if the sample selection 
process is time constant.    18
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, and we therefore focus on the results from 
the fixed effect and the sample selection models. 
(Table 5 about here) 
  Focusing first on the difference in moonlighting activity between assistant and 
consulting physicians both the fixed effect model and the sample selection model 
show that, ceteris paribus, assistant physicians have higher income from self-
employment than consultant physicians. However, given that the physicians have 
decided to earn external income, the levels of incomes for the two groups are not very 
different, and the estimated effect is significant at the 10% level only. The size 
(measured in hospital beds) or type of hospital (local compared to regional and 
central hospitals) does not seem to influence much on the physician’ moonlighting 
activity. The only exception is that physicians working at central hospitals are less 
likely to have income from self-employment than others. On the other hand, family 
characteristics (whether the physician is married or have children younger than 3) 
have an effect on how much the physicians work outside the hospital, but not on 
whether they have external income or not. Married physicians earn less from self-
employment than others, while the opposite is the case for physicians having children 
younger than 3 years of age.  
Turning now to our main variables of interest, we observe from the sample 
selection model that the hourly wage rate has a negative and significant effect on the 
participation decision and on magnitude of external income from self-employment, 
but only so for assistant physicians. The descriptive statistics in section 3 indicated 
that most of the wage effect worked through the participation decision and this seems 
to be confirmed from these results. In the fixed effect model the coefficient on the   19
interaction “Wage*assistant physician” is 0.4256 while in the two-stage model this 
coefficient is only 0.0712.  
Lastly we look at the effects of job characteristics. The occupancy rate, 
number of health personnel (nurses and physicians) per bed and costs per bed provide 
information about work-load at the hospitals. Thus, they are reasonable proxies for 
job characteristics that increase or decrease job related stress, and thus they represent 
important work condition variables. More physicians per bed reduce income from 
non-hospital jobs but do not affect the participation decision. It is reasonable to 
assume that physician staffing indicates the work load which a given physicians faces 
on the margin. Thus, more physicians per bed are less stressful and considered a more 
attractive job characteristic. The quite clear picture of a positive effect from more 
nurses per bed is perhaps more surprising. It may be the case that nurses to a small 
degree can substitute for physicians. Another problem in interpreting this variable is 
that the increase in number of nurses went hand-in-hand with an even larger reduction 
in number of auxiliary nurses. Thus, during this period more nurses per bed do not 
necessarily reflect improved working conditions for physicians, since it is unclear 
how the total effect of the two simultaneous events turned out for nursing services. 
The  occupancy rate works in the expected direction. There is a positive and 
significant effect on external wage income, as well as on the participation decision 
from the selection models. Occupancy is a variable with very clear interpretation in 
terms of work-load, and it gives as such good support for the simple theoretical and 
empirical formulation of the model. In hospitals with high costs per bed, physicians 
are less likely to have income from self-employment, and they will have lower 
external income once participating.   20
We interpret the results held together that hospital wages have a clear effect on 
assistant physician’s decision to work as self-employed. However, among consultant 
physicians we find no indications that hospital wages have affected the moonlighting 
activity. The physicians’ job characteristics are important for their decisions to 
moonlight and work as self-employed, beyond their full time job at the hospital.  
 
6. Concluding remarks. 
We find a significantly negative effect of wages on assistant physicians’ income from 
self-employment. Thus, wage policy and efforts to affect working conditions are 
viable instruments for controlling activity in public hospitals. 
The wage effect works both trough the decision to moonlight, and wages 
affect level of activity for those who have income from external sources. Our results 
indicate that a model that is able to correct for unobserved heterogeneity as well as 
sample selection is warranted so as to be able to isolate effects from a particular 
reform, here a generous wage increase taking place one specific year but with long-
lasting effects. Work conditions at the hospitals are also important for incentives to 
earn income externally.  When work environment gets more stressful, as measured by 
capacity utilization and number of peers available, physicians tend to earn more 
externally. 
Admittedly, the variables included to proxy for work characteristics may also 
capture general demand for health care services. Also for physicians in public 
hospitals, a high demand will affect their job opportunities in private practices. As 
seen from the physicians’ point of view, possible demand effects, and reactions to 
unpleasant work conditions, will work in the same direction. Whether a high work-
load and stressful work situation stem from high demand or from bad organization of   21
work, it may induce the physician to allocate additional hours of work outside the 
public hospital, since a private unit will generally be able on the margin to offer 
higher payment. For policy, the consequences will be different. If difficult work 
conditions at the public hospitals result from shortage of physicians, which is again 
due to high demand for health care services compared to capacity, there seems to be a 
better argument for alleviating the problem through wage compensation, given that 
labour is available elsewhere. However, if the tendency for moonlighting has its 
origin in poor organization, and corresponding stressful working conditions, wage 
policy may still work, through compensating wage differentials, but a better policy 
may be to reorganise production conditions and improve internal organization of 
work. 
   22
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Table 1 Variable definitions. 
Income from self-employment  Yearly income from self-employment (in 100 NoK.) 
Hourly wage  Hourly wage in the hospital 
Non-labour income  Spouse income + capital income 
Age Physicians  age 
Male  Dummy variable which equal one if the physician is a male 
Married  Dummy variable which equal one if the physician is married 
Children<3  Dummy=1 if having children less than 3 years of age, 0 
otherwise 
Assistant physician  Dummy=1 if assistant physician, 0 if consultant physician 
Nurses per physician  Number of nurses per physician 
Physician per bed  Number of physicians per hospital bed 
Length of stay  Total inpatients days/number of patients (in 100) 
Occupancy rate  Total inpatient days*100/effective beds*365  
Hospital beds  Total number of beds set-up and staffed for use (in 100) 
Central  hospital  Dummy=1 if working at central or regional hospital, 0 
otherwise 
County hospital  Dummy=1 if working in a county hospital, 0 otherwise 
Centrality 1  
 
Dummy variables which equal one if the physician is living 
in a municipality classified as “most central” 
Centrality 2 
 
Dummy variables which equal one if the physician is living 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 













































Assistant  physician  0.37 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.39 




















Male  0.78 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.71 
Married  0.77 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.74 
Child_y3  0.20 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 


















































County  hospital  0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Central  hospital 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 
Central  1  0.62 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.62 
Central  2  0.22 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 
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Table 3. Income from self-employment and hospital wages, assistant physicians. 
















































Table 4. Income from self-employment and hospital wages, consultant physicians. 












































0.29   26
 Table 5.  External income; OLS, fixed effect and sample selection models. 
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